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INTRODUCTION1
The concept of power has been the subject of variously disciplined studies.2 The
common point in discourse on power is the noticeable use of force and violence
symbolically, physically, or verbally. Throughout the centuries, power has been
displayed in a variety of forms, from economic domination to flat-out terror. There
have been states exalting violence against civilians to obtain political or ideological
goals, e.g., in ancient times under the regime of Nero and Caligula, during the
period of the French Revolution, or in the times of Bolshevik Russia.3 Brutality
and the fulfillment of political and ideological aims using violence against civilians
is reminiscent of terrorism. Its contemporary developments appear to be even more
visible than ever because of terrorists’ massive engagement in the media, treated
by them as recruitment area, and a battlefield. Each epoch has its own definition
of terrorism, and the reality following 9/11 redefined terrorism as it was known
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Here we mean Al-Qaeda or the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS). In this article we focus mostly
on ISIS as probably the most powerful exemplary case, but many other organizations are meant here
that are similar ideologically, structurally, or are more or less connected with ISIS, such as the Al-
Quaeda Network (especially with Al-Nusra Front), Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, Hezbollah, Palestinian
Islamic Jihad, Hamas, Ansar al-Sharia, and Fatah Al-Islam.
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from the past. This does not mean that we have forgotten the broad typologies of
terrorism or the smaller organizations that still act today. After 9/11, Westerners
do not think of “terrorism” so much as left- or right-wing extremist organizations,
but rather envisage brutal acts in Africa, the Middle East, and on the borders of
Syria and Iraq. They imagine that in these places, a powerful voice condemns in-
fidels and the West in general, and there is a physical clash of powers. This voice
is amplified by the development of new media that are handily utilized. Just as the
Vietnam war was more visible and triggered more social contests because of more
media coverage than in previous wars, a similar situation is occurring with terror-
ism nowadays. Additionally, the amount of terrorist acts committed for religious
reasons (the Matsumoto incident, the Madrid train bombing, and the London,
Istanbul, and New Delhi bombings) show the characteristics of the most recent
shape of terrorism. What is important for this study are the distinct ideas that can
be identified behind terrorism. Therefore, the aim of this article is (1) the identi-
fication of ideas standing behind major terrorist organizations that show the rela-
tionship between terrorism and power, and (2) terrorism’s reference to the
mechanisms of seizing power, giving ideas specific, contextual meaning. The main
methods used here are case studies and the critical analysis composed of some or-
ganizations’ statements, manifestos, media coverage, and references to religious
texts. The aim is to answer the following questions: Do the ideas selected below
really drive terrorist groups in the Middle East? How does look the process of en-
acting the ideas work? What are the (global) consequences of such terrorist activity?
There is also an ontological issue that might arise: are ideas “transmitters” of power
and values, i.e., do they have a specific meaning attached? Or do they just trigger
some mindset and behavior by specific nature and use in context? Most revolu-
tions, wars, and other conflicts have been grounded in some ideology. Not only is
the manifestation of power crucial in the case of conflicts, but also in the ideas
that stand behind the conflicts and form ideologies. We have already faced different
ideas throughout history, e.g. Übermensch, the proletarian nation, and collectivism
during the rise of fascism in Italy, Nazism in Germany, and communism in Soviet
Russia. We will try to prove that such an affection for ideas is also visible nowadays
in the case of a popular flag and other examples of terrorism.4
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THE MEANING OF TERROR AND TERRORISM
The meaning of terrorism has varied a lot throughout the ages; until the twentieth
century, it was difficult for scholars to define its modern meaning univocally.
Throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, we have witnessed the con-
stant redefinition of terrorism.5 International agendas are still defining the next
types of terrorism in international conventions,6 although there is no univocal def-
inition devoted only to terrorism and accepted by affiliated states. The regulations
are dispersed in documents regarding fields of activity such as air traffic or financ-
ing of terrorist organizations. Combining this with the variety of forms of terrorism
that violent organizations and movements can be organized in, it seems necessary
to be as precise as possible in this definition without getting stuck in tricky details.
Violent political movements, for example, can transform very rapidly7 and act as
terrorists at one moment, and as a completely legal party in the next. 
According to one of the major works of the history of ideas, Geschichtliche
Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexicon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland,
terror and terrorism appear in at least four different meanings: biblical-theological,
psychological-aesthetical, political, and legal.8 Generally, terror refers to fear, for
example the fear of God, authorities, or the government; it can be individual or
mass-oriented. During the French Revolution in 1789, terror peaked in use, and
was used for describing a particular historical period, namely the turn in the Rev-
olution after Thermidor 9th (July 27, 1794), a day called “époque de la terreur.”
Social changes occurring after this period connected with the process of forming
nation states brought another perspective. The development of leftist socialist and
anarchist thought which distinguished and admired the working class, as well as
the need for revolution, effected in national, political, ideological, and govern-
mental forms of terror, among other things. This was visible during the Bolshevik
revolution and after the Second World War in Stalin’s Soviet Russia. Also, right-
wing policy resorted to terror, e.g., National Socialism in Germany. Apparently,
the extremist and most radical versions of any ideology that allowed violence
tended to sow fear through terror. While the use of the concept of terror has de-
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creased since early modern times and has been replaced with terrorism, a significant
rise in this word usage dates from the early nineteenth century up until today.9
After broadening the scope of terror through the French Revolution, none other
than a Frenchman attempted to deconstruct it. Jacques Derrida, interviewed by
Giovanna Borradori after 9/11, the breakthrough point in history for understand-
ing contemporary terrorism, analyzed this example to describe the most recent
facet of terrorism exhaustively, using “terror,” “international terrorism,” and other
phrases, and at the same time referring to political, ideological, and social contexts
on the local and global scale. He makes the following points: the lack of dialogue
between the West and Islam was induced by the lack of Enlightenment, colonial-
ism, or imperialism in Africa or the Middle East; the result of this lack of dialogue
is that people are taking up arms and the distinction between civilians, police and
the military is vanishing. This makes the terrorism of 9/11 appear “wealthy, hy-
persophisticated, telecommunicative, anonymous, and without an assignable
state.”10 Derrida points out another factor that is essential for today’s (global) ter-
rorism: the development of technology. Terrorism is aimed at the imagination and
a sense of security. It is both symbolic and mental, and aims to provoke reactions
more or less intentionally. In times of sophisticated information technology and
nanotechnologies, it is no longer always necessary to use open violence but rather
to attack information systems, computers, databases, etc. The use of contemporary
technologies also includes media that are very important for both sides of conflict:
terrorists use them so that their actions can be as transparent as possible, and anti-
terrorists need them to justify their measures for fighting terrorism. But the use of
technology does not mean the end of open violence. Derrida notes in his essay
“Faith and Knowledge” that people tend to use extreme violence in the name of
religion, including torture, beheadings, or rape, to declare “revenge” (similar to
the French Revolution) and rage against informatization. Numerous examples of
cotemporary wars can be mentioned here, such as those in Rwanda, Pakistan,
Yemen, and many others.11
The  terminology is unclear after that point. The dichotomy of freedom
fighter/terrorist no longer exists. The definition of terror changes according to the
current situation and international agendas are not able—or do not want—to
work out a consistent definition. Among other things, the reason for this is to en-
able anti-terrorist intervention wars, allowing veterans from these military conflicts
to be paid. Moreover, contemporary terrorists do not need territory as much as in
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the past; now, their actions are aimed at boosting technocratic power or political
control which is also determined geopolitically.12
At some point, the semantic difference between terror and terrorism is notice-
able. For Western civilization, terror has primarily referred to the reign of dictators,
Caesars, and emperors and described the forms and methods of their governance.
According to Tom O’Connor, we have been able to use the term terrorism in a
more modern sense since the French Revolution. For example, Edmund Burke
uses this term to describe the governance of the Jacobins, including their means
and methods.13 The difference between the prerevolutionary and post-revolution-
ary meanings of terror/terrorism is not so obvious. From today’s perspective, terror
is related to a state or government’s activity. Here we can mention the well-known
totalitarian regimes of Stalin, Hitler, and Mussolini. According to Boaz Ganor,
terrorism, the more modern term, refers to different extremist groups, organiza-
tions, and individuals who aim to harm or threaten non-combatants (using vio-
lence) and have a particular political aim (meaning it could also be ideological or
religious).14 Mikkel Thorup makes another distinction. According to his Intellectual
History of Terror, terror refers to state-related violent activities, while terrorism is
separate from the state. It remains a kind of anti-state power and is connected to
individual acts and organizations opposing the state (however, he has a different
category for anarchists and nihilists).15 Usually, terrorists are not part of an au-
thorized or legal (internationally acknowledged) power, but they might gain power
as the Jacobins did in the past and significant terrorist organizations still do today.   
CONTEXT OF IDEOLOGY
Behind each struggle stand special motifs, world views, and contextual conditions.
The act of seizing power usually comes from and serves the purposes stated by
ideas, ideologies, a sense of identity, or other socially unifying phenomena. Power
is seldom seized, and terrorism is seldom enacted, just for the sake of its own.
These actions belong more to the realm of anarchists. Having a look at what is
happening in the Middle East at the borders of Syria and Iraq especially, one might
think about the dark past of Nazi Germany. The current situation stemmed from
the destabilization of the territory of Iraq and Syria. This destabilization was caused
by the military interventions of the United States, the United Nations, and the
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as well as the Syrian Civil War as a conse-
quence of the Arab Spring. Smaller paramilitary fractions, guerillas, and terrorist
groups first fought among themselves, and then many of them joined together
under one flag to fight against the forces allied in the war on terrorism. These peo-
ple need to pay taxes that appear to be closer to extortion just to have the basic
necessities of water and electricity. Even more significantly, UN reports state that
kidnappings usually demand the payment of ransom.16 The conditions of eco-
nomic and political crisis opened the gates for extremisms such as the extensive
use of violence and harsh laws. Among the main aims of local terrorist organiza-
tions is the proclamation of the caliphate. This was completed in 201417 and aimed
at a world caliphate. We find references to literal, very conservative interpretations
of the Quran and Sharia law, referring especially to Wahhabi/Salafi movements
demanding the return to the roots of the religion, i.e., a pivotal understanding of
the Quran. We especially see some references to the teaching of Wahhabism by
Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, a former of orthodox Sunni Islam. Alastair
Crooke, a British diplomat and a former of Conflicts Forum,18 conducted a histor-
ical analysis of Wahhabism and suggested some interesting comparisons. He writes: 
Abd al-Wahhab demanded conformity -- a conformity that was to be demon-
strated in physical and tangible ways. He argued that all Muslims must indi-
vidually pledge their allegiance to a single Muslim leader (a Caliph, if there
were one). Those who would not conform to this view should be killed, their
wives and daughters violated, and their possessions confiscated, he wrote. The
list of apostates meriting death included the Shiite, Sufis and other Muslim de-
nominations, whom Abd al-Wahhab did not consider to be Muslim at all. 
[...]
Their [wahhabists’] strategy -- like that of ISIS today -- was to bring the peoples
whom they conquered into submission. They aimed to instill fear.19
Human Rights Watch reports on the discrimination of religions other than Wah-
habi/Salafi-Islam, and severe punishments for not obeying specific rules. Historical
periods of turbulence, especially the years of the formation of the Saudi State dur-
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ing 1741-1818, led to the current situation in the Middle East. Now, we can ob-
serve the increasing popularity of violent solutions, because of which
Wahhabism was forcefully changed from a movement of revolutionary jihad
and theological takfiri purification, to a movement of conservative social, po-
litical, theological, and religious da’wa (Islamic call) and to justifying the insti-
tution that upholds loyalty to the royal Saudi family and the King’s absolute
power.20
Therefore, this religious movement is currently connected mostly with extremism
and jihad. Natana J. DeLong-Bas, author of books on Islam and jihadism, notices
that contemporary interpretations of Wahhabi’s writings do not fully reflect their
contents. In her book, which pioneers English translations of Wahhabi’s texts from
Arabic, she proposes some interesting perspectives on the issue. We read that 
Wahhabism in the contemporary era is largely portrayed as misogynist, denying
women their human rights, insisting on strict gender segregation, forbidding
women access to public space, and subjugating them by considering them in-
ferior to men. [... but] the term Wahhabism is rarely defined. Many of the
regimes and movements labelled as Wahhabi in the contemporary era do not
necessarily share the same theological and legal orientations. The reality is that
Wahhabism has become such a blanket term for any Islamic movement that
has an apparent tendency toward misogyny, militarism, extremism, or a strict
literal interpretation of the Quran.21
Confirmation of this statement can be complemented with the text of another au-
thor who writes about Wahhabi and Saudi Arabia, David Commins: “To judge
the issue fairly, Ibn Azzuz [Tunisian Sheikh] looked over some Wahhabi writings
and concluded that their beliefs were sound. His letter [to Mahmud al-Alusi] gives
a sense of how elastic the meaning of ‘Wahhabi’ had become.”22
The understanding of Wahhabism as the most comprehensive (including reli-
gion, politics, and law) and influential movement depicts its importance and ex-
plains most of its ideological weight. It still remains a way of a interpreting bigger
idea: the idea of God. 
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IDEAS
God and Faith
A strong attachment to God and faith seems to be one of the most important el-
ements for the face of terrorism today. Wahhabi-rooted terrorists openly manifest
their faith and find religious texts as justification for their activity, even though
the vast majority of the interpreters of Islam reject such a narrative. Moreover,
within Wahhabism there are arguments about the use of violence and punishment
for apostates and infidels. Just after the world witnessed violence in France at the
beginning of 2015, the national Muslim leagues in many countries condemned it
for having nothing in common with Islam. Even controversial fragments from the
Quran about Jihad are not interpreted literally today by most Muslims but rather
are exploited and violated for the purpose of undertaking illegal military actions.
But can one not also find violence in other religious texts like the Bible or Torah?
Yes; however, the organizations that are the most transparent and dangerous for
international safety are organizations exploiting the Quran as their argument for
violence.  
An integral part of the idea of God is faith (iman) in Islam. The belief in six ar-
ticles of Islam is the reason why terrorists believe that non-believers should be ex-
ecuted regardless of is in Hadith, the collection of Muhammad’s sayings: “none of
you believes until he wishes for his brother what he wishes for himself,” a line
which resembles the golden rule. Besides the importance of God, this indicates
their selectiveness in their choice and interpretation of religious texts. 
(Religious) Law
The special place of religion among contemporary terrorists points to the rules of
religious law. As was stated earlier, today’s terrorism is largely linked with extreme
interpretations of Islam, even though they are rejected by the majority of believers.
The basic form of social and political organization is, for example, a caliphate23
based upon Sharia law. Such a “state” has already appeared at the borders of Syria
and Iraq. Sharia regulates both religious behavior and everyday activities. There is
no such thing as the separation of religion and state that has been important for
the Western world since the Enlightenment. All possible fields of human activity
are subjugated to religion through the law. This issue is strongly connected to the
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dichotomy of morals and ethics. According to Graham Hughes, the author of the
entry about law in the Dictionary of the History of Ideas:
                                                                                                                            
In primitive societies legal rules are often not sharply distinguished from reli-
gious prescriptions and the dictates of social morality or convention. It is only
with the emergence of law as a distinct and organized form of social control in
a relatively advanced civilization that the problems mentioned above become
apparent. The Greek Sophists raised such questions in the fourth and fifth cen-
turies B.C. They distinguished between nature (physis) and convention or law
(nomos) and regarded law as an artificial, man-made scheme of regulation which
encroached upon natural freedoms.
[...]
The sharp separation between law and morals which has characterized the pos-
itivist position becomes difficult to defend when the close similarities between
legal and moral reasoning are pointed out. In this way contemporary studies
of legal reasoning hold out some promise of bridging the ancient division be-
tween positivist and natural law traditions.
Such an opinion helps explain the need for Sharia law. In these circumstances,
ethics are almost equated with morals, so there is no separation between the power
of the state and the power of religion. This set of rules, because of its contradictions
in logic and its ambiguities, is the outcome of several hundred years’ worth of in-
terpretations of the Quran. However, it is very useful for terrorists who can im-
plement it to control people. Such sociopolitical organization helps in seizing and
holding power, especially while rejecting international laws and taking part in ex-
treme violence.
However, along with the development of civilization and the strengthening of
international bonds between countries in the economic, political, and cultural
spheres (called globalization or mondialisation), the extreme conservative and vi-
olent versions of Islamic terrorism may be doomed to isolation and condemnation.
This can be seen in the interventions of democratic states in these areas. The rea-
sons for this inevitable decline are mostly connected with the terrorists’ disrespect
of basic laws: their violation of human rights in various manners (homicides, geno-
cides), and the act of threatening and terrorizing world governments. According
to some, e.g., Neil Smelser, post 9/11 terrorism is not anything new, especially
with regard to globalization. This is because nothing is new about ideologies or
proceedings. Others, such as Gemma Edwards,24 claim globalization is a phenom-
enon without a particular influence—other than cultural—on the spread of ter-
rorism. Either way, terrorists can have more attention placed on their activity
through transnational networks and global access to media, and they attempt to
recruit new members this way. The most recent cases of terrorist groups indicate
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the formation of a strong cultural opposition to the globalized, liberal economic
models rooted in Western culture. It is certain that modern technologies and social
processes occurring worldwide have allowed different groups to be more visible
than ever. 
Power and Protest 
The visibility or transparency of social movements can often be distorted. Images
delivered by global networks are not only often selective, but particular labels can
be put on social phenomena. The revolution of 2010 and 2011 in Middle Eastern
and North African countries was a huge destabilizing factor conducive to the emer-
gence of radical movements. Dissatisfaction caused by a lowered status of living,
e.g., by high food prices, and oppressive authoritarian regimes provoked the out-
break of violent and nonviolent actions. Such an environment, a conglomerate of
disadvantageous factors connected to economy, politics, and culture, is a favorable
milieu for triggering uncontrollable power stemming from the social organization.
Strong fundamentalist-driven ideology that accompanied terrorist organizations
in the Middle East took a chance and had a strong backing from protest move-
ments that arose during the Arab Spring and Winter. According to Jean Jacques
Waardenburg, we can distinguish three kinds of religious movements that have
the characteristics of a protest. The first kind is related to groups struggling with
Western domination and economic models; the second refers to moral decline and
reformative movements; and the third involves indirect forms of protest within
Islam referring to law and mysticism.25 Nevertheless, the author tends to describe
religion as a vehicle for socio-political and economic factors, as well. Contemporary
Middle Eastern terrorism can be classified as the first kind of religious movements
with the characteristics of a protest because of Sunni religious leaders, violence,
and open protest against Western domination. In 1978, Adel Faouzi wrote about
four types of protest movements. One of them is considered to be the establish-
ment of an Islamic state, has a militant-political character, and involves extreme
actions. Another is considered to have an ideological character including discrim-
ination and injustice, resist the influence of other cultures, and aim at the expan-
sion of Islam to become a normative and ideological pattern.26 Nowadays, in
addition to the classic “Louis-Auguste Blanqui [who] preached revolution for rev-
olution’s sake, with only the vaguest suggestion of the social and political justice
Dawid Kamil Wieczorek112
P. Stears: Protest Movements. [In:] P. Wiener (ed.): Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected
Pivotal Ideas (1905-1992). Online version based on 1974 print edition in: http://onlinebooks.li-
brary.upenn.edu, [02-08-2015], p. 671.
Ibidem, p. 676. 
For the mechanism and the process of such transformations see: S. Adnan/A. Reese: Middle East Se-
curity Report 24. Beyond the Islamic State: Iraqi Sunni Insurgency. [In:] Institute for the Study of War
website <understandingwar.org> 2014, as well as St. Wicken/J. Lewis: From Protest Movement to
Armed Resistance: 2013 Iraq Update #24. [In:] ibid., June 15, 2013.
Ibid.
27
28
29
30
that would ensue,”27 we also need to bear in mind that protests and revolutionary
movements are highly contextualized. According to Peter N. Stears, author of the
protest movements entry in the Dictionary of the History of Ideas,28
[...] a successful protest ideology leads to quite diverse protest movements in
different regions, among different social groups, even among different person-
ality types. Socialism among stubborn but practical miners, to use one example,
was never the same as socialism among more visionary textile workers.  
It implies that the understanding of more factors is necessary to grasp the charac-
teristics of terrorist, revolutionary, or protest groups. In the Middle East, it was
possible to transform the protest movements into one very active, open-militant,
and wealthy organization29 due to a specific conglomeration of ideological, reli-
gious, and economic factors: the Islamic religion, extremist interpretations and
ideologies, frustration caused by the military destabilization of the region, external
funding, and oilfields. 
The very special context for the unification of insurgents and terrorists can then
be characterized by a complex manipulative strategy (due to social media skills
and propaganda), engagement in insurgent movements and civil wars, and the ex-
tensive use of violence and strong fundamentalism. Quoting Stears, “The future
of the study of ideas and protest lies in the admittedly difficult examination of the
actual contacts between ideas and those who use them.”30 In doing so, one notices
the importance of who uses ideas like freedom or liberation. People who first
fought for freedom and later became engaged in the wave of the anti-dictatorship
movement soon became fighters for the caliphate that claims to be a “state.” 
Statehood and Totality
The Frankfurt School thoroughly examined the phenomenon of totalitarianism
after the twentieth century’s traumatic experience of totalitarian states. The School
of Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and Max Horkheimer, among others, at-
tributed it to the development of mass media. Even though the characteristics of
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the media in the 1940s and 60s was very different than the contemporary one,
one might find some interesting similarities. The momentum for Dialectic of En-
lightenment (1944)31 was immediately important to the growth of media, such as
radio and television, which was exploited heavily by totalitarian regimes. A similar
rapid growth took place at the beginning of the twenty-first century when the In-
ternet became the primary tool for banking, communication, entertainment, and
other, less obvious purposes: data gathering and processing, the monitoring of net-
works and real-life activity, and criminal activity. Terrorists know how to use social
media to attract people, especially youth. However, the placement of media in the
non-mainstream understanding of a state is challenging and demands additional
training. What is the understanding of a state in reference to caliphates? 
One might mention here the vast variety of understandings of what a state is,
from that of Aristotle, Plato, and Machiavelli to Marx, Weber, and Jessop. There-
fore, we will refer to the basic documents concerning this issue. According to them,
“the state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifica-
tions: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and
(d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.” 32 Until now, the popu-
lation of terrorist-controlled areas was constantly changing and consisted of many
nations, mostly from the conquered Syrian and Iraqi citizens that still formally
have their citizenship, in contrast to the terrorists who were supposed to lose it.
Their territory is not defined clearly and is still being developed. This is also be-
cause of terrorists’ expansive ambitions; according to Terrorism Research and Analy-
sis Consortium, the governmental structures of today’s caliphate in Syria, Iraq, and
the Levant are still developing but are already functional, providing basic necessities
such as food, gas, water, and electricity to people; on the other hand, they also de-
cide who is to be beheaded.33 In reference to the last point (d), their constant
threatening and violations of the international conventions make it impossible to
have a dialogue with them. Thus, according to Montevideo Convention, today’s
caliphates cannot be considered states—not even as religious states, as some North-
European countries have claimed. The difference between the state religions of
today is that most of them respect international law and are acknowledged and
respected by international society as states. 
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In the discussion of the statehood of currently proclaimed caliphates, we should
also mention their form of governance. Let us take the example of the Islamic
State of Iraq and Sham. Behind the organization stands one person with the high-
est power (the caliph/commander in chief ), Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (nom de guerre),
whose real name is Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali Muhammad al-Badri al-
Samarrai;34 he is the leader of the ultraconservative movement of Sunni Islam.
Under his power we can distinguish two deputies: Abu Muslim al-Turkmani, the
deputy of Iraq, and Abu Ali al-Anbari, the deputy of Syria. They are the “brains”
of the organization’s ideology. Under each deputy are twelve governors for Iraq
and twelve for Syria: financial, leadership, military, legal, fighters’ assistance, se-
curity, intelligence, and media councils. There is also an executive branch, which
is a cabinet with Baghdadi’s advisers that is superior to the Shura council that reg-
ulates religious and military affairs. This structure might be reminiscent of the or-
ganization of a state, but there are factors that make it more like a totalitarian
regime. Michael Curtis writes about the totalitarian concept:35
The totalitarian concept has been a useful term to typify a particular genre of
contemporary regime in an age of mass democracy in which the population
can be controlled by a variety of means, especially terror. Dictatorships, despo-
tisms, and autocratic regimes are akin to totalitarian ones in their elitist rule,
arbitrary use of political power, minimization of private individual rights, and
in their ordered and hierarchical institutions. [...] Totalitarian systems embody
not only strong and arbitrary power but also the insistence on conformity of
the whole society, mass mobilization, the subjugation of all classes to a domi-
nant political group and attacks on the “enemies” of the system and on their
ideology. Resting on mass support and mass movements rather than on the
economic and social groups that formed the elite in earlier systems and main-
tained by a combination of force, indoctrination, and propaganda, the totali-
tarian regime is tutelary in nature, purporting to incarnate the true and
necessary values to give meaning to the lives of its citizens.   
In the case of terrorist-governed caliphates, it is hard to speak of any sort of democ-
racy. The “state” is rather control through terror. It is not an authoritarian state
where pluralism, freedom to enter the economic market, and freedom of expres-
sion are given to the citizens. Authoritarian countries usually do not have an offi-
cial ideology, while totalitarian regimes do. Curtis continues:36
The distinctiveness of totalitarianism arises, as Orwell argued, in the effort to
control thoughts and emotions as well as actions. Its novelty is in the more ef-
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ficient technological devices, the mass media, the skilled personnel, and the
mass support available for coercion, manipulation, and indoctrination of whole
populations to implement the perceived truth or objectives and to bring about
the desired changes in thought and action.
Just to give an example of how skillfully an individual or group can be manipu-
lated, controlled, and surrendered to somebody else’s power, see the case of Al-
Khanssaa Brigade, the female terrorist group. In their last manifesto, we can see
that their thoughts, emotions, and behavior are totally controlled by an outside
force. The document was translated and released on the website of the Quilliam
Foundation, a counter-extremism think-tank, in February 2015. According to
Charlie Winter, the translator, it was not released in English for Western audiences
because of its complete disregard of Western values. First, in this document we
find a huge critique of Western science, lifestyles, aesthetics, and many other areas
of life. The most important, and perhaps the only, arguments against West are its
atheism, materialism, and “distraction from the fundamental purpose of humanity
– to worship God”. Frankfurt School representatives write about the subject who
desires to kill and who has always seen the (potential) oppressor in his victim. Un-
bearable danger demands illusory self-defense, as when terrorists respond to the
economic, cultural, and military “campaign” of the West by encouraging people
around the world to take up arms against it and discredit the culture en bloc. In
Dialectic... this is called “rationalization.”37 In this case, the logic of religion is ap-
plied heavily. The destruction takes no hostages, and the will to kill and destroy is
total.38 It becomes especially dangerous for international peace when moral or eth-
ical justifications are applied. Such driven terrorists do not display universalistic
thoughts; rather, they tend to think totally, or in a totalitarian manner, by subju-
gating others to their worldview with the extensive use of global media. Second,
we can read about the failure of the “Western program for women,” by which fem-
inism is meant, and the emasculation of men as a consequence of blurring the
lines between the roles of each sex. Third, the issue of women’s education and life-
organization is undertaken by the author. Women’s function should be “sedentary.”
They should have responsibilities connected “first and foremost” with the home.
Marriage is very important and a female-child can enter it at the age of nine.
Woman can only leave the house in a few cases: “a) if she is going to study theology,
b) if she is a doctor or a teacher, [and] c) if she has been ruled by fatwa that she
must fight, engage in jihad because the situation of the ummah has become des-
perate [...].”39 In further verses, we can read about the periods of a woman’s life
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during which certain values should be taught, and the ideal models for Muslim
women. In most cases, there are references to the past Shiite government as a bad
one, depriving people of healthcare, ability to run small business, education, and
basic necessities such as electricity, waste disposal, or elderly care.40 The very last
verses might even be exhorting Muslims to fight against the West:41
To [...] the enemies of chastity and purity, the secularists and liberals from
among our own people, women have been returned to their Rightful jilbabs
and sedentary lifestyle. Throw the sputum of your culture, your civilisation
and your thinking into the sea. God fights you and you are not of us and we
are not of you.   
The way that text is written insinuates that a Muslim woman’s life is joyful, and
the organization of life under the governance of the caliph is fitting for them. And
maybe this is so. Adorno and Horkheimer, probably inspired by Freudian theories,
wrote about women’s affection for paranoid, unmoved men who use and manip-
ulate them. Fear of one’s own conscience can be quieted by a lack of it in others.42
Such an understanding explains the aforementioned opposition of feminist move-
ments in the West. However, further analysis triggers some concerns about the
honesty and credibility of the manifesto. It is reminiscent of skillful recruitment
propaganda rather than an outline of facts. The overall character of the manifesto
insinuates that everything about the West is wrong and the only acceptable way
of realizing oneself is by worshipping God according to the very specific rules
given there. The language is also very emotional. There are few facts, but many
opinions. It aims to be personal and triggers worries about one’s own life or health.
The use of such a document fits into the first three criteria of totalitarianism as
outlined by Curtis.43
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Generally speaking, social media channels and fundamentalist terrorist writings
look similar. There are similar actors—good and bad ones, winners and losers—
in addition to analogous scenarios and comparable slogans. The message is put
forth at every possible occasion. There is also a strong bond between religion and
the use of force, manifesting power. We constantly hear religious shouts interrupted
by gunshots and explosions. Most of the men are carrying arms, their faces are
covered, and they behave like paramilitary troops.44 In addition, there is a regular
army standing in complete opposition to them that openly bears arms and respects
international conventions on basic human rights and proceedings during warfare. 
We might suppose that such endeavors are aimed at controlling the social order
and providing a foundation for a new type of man. When somebody disobeys the
rules, he or she might be threatened by the use of terror. Therefore, we watch and
read about “nonbelievers,” homosexuals, and executions of unfaithful women. Ac-
cording to the United Nations and Amnesty International reports, women in some
Islamic terrorist-controlled areas are also the victims of rape, slavery, and assassi-
nation.45 In addition, these organizations commit various violent acts like behead-
ings, lapidating, the defenestration of homosexuals, burning people alive, the abuse
women and children, and organ trafficking.46 The brutality in the Middle East is
continuing to escalate,47 although it has even been condemned by the infamous
Al-Quaeda.48 When terrorists intentionally threaten people subjected to the force
of terror with violence, it makes them feel more powerful. Needless to say, threats
are still a form of violence. Besides the fact that this organization is militarily ori-
ented, in the process of gaining power they also educate people, or in this case we
would rather say that they indoctrinate or manipulate people.49
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IDEAS TURNED INTO POWER – THE ROLE OF EDUCATION
Malcolm Coaxall mentions nepotism, coercion, bribery, intimidation, terrorism,
and education as the primary tools of social control.50 The means of education
can be powerful tools and, when used in a skillful way, they can attract new fol-
lowers to ideas, ideology, and religion. In this case, we witness a very organized
structure of recruitment and brainwashing through the use of religion (actually,
exploiting people’s faith) and media. There are easily-accessible terrorist-ideological
newspapers,51 videos, and TV-programs on the Internet that are disseminated
through popular social media both officially by organizations and unofficially by
their members on personal accounts. They are hashtag-hijacking, i.e., infiltrating
tweets and online conversations and creating “bots” (infiltrated networks of com-
puters) in order to conduct anonymous activity. The fact that terrorist organiza-
tions have a structure where some cells are devoted strictly to media development
leads us to two conclusions: first, media are of great importance because they have
the ability to control, manipulate, and indoctrinate current members; second,
media are a basic tool that can be used for recruiting new members, not excluding
women, and boost the power of the organization.52 Targeting the youngest audi-
ence gives the organization a greater possibility to enlarge the number of its faithful
and members who follow it blindly. The process of selectively creating images for
the media, as we mentioned during the discussion of interpretations of religious
texts, is another form of manipulation. As social media are accessible almost world-
wide, the process of seizing social power does not demand anything more than
access to the Internet and some basic electronic devices.  
In 1959, John French and Bertram Raven published an article in The Psycho-
logical Review describing the theory of social power.53 They identified five sources
of power: legitimate, reward, coercive, expert, and referent (a sixth, informational,
was added later). Terrorists’ efforts may be analyzed through these sources. The
base for (social) power is the relationship between person A and person B. This
relationship can be shaped in different ways, according to the sources mentioned
above. The first source is connected with the internalization of specific “ought-
ness,” which can be based, for example, upon values transmitted by parents to
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children (this is the educative aspect).54 It is also compared with the Freudian super-
ego. Cultural values are first mentioned here as a base for legitimate power.55
These bases, which Weber (41) has called the authority of the “eternal yester-
day,” include such things as age, intelligence, caste, and physical characteristics.
In some cultures, the aged are granted the right to prescribe behavior for others
in practically all behavior areas. In most cultures, there are certain areas of be-
havior in which a person of one sex is granted the right to prescribe behavior
for the other sex.
Combining this with the acceptance of social structures and their agents forms
two more bases for this source of power. In the case of today’s caliphates, people
who belong to them have to accept the (self proclaimed) religious state organiza-
tion which is founded upon Sharia law. The head of the state who executes law
and order through the structured administration is the caliph. He also acknowl-
edges decisions on lower levels by giving power to these structures. Cultural values
are very important here because the law is based on religion and a strong tradition
connected with the Quran. Therefore, affirmation for this type of power can be
very strong. 
The second source, called reward power,56
is defined as power whose basis is the ability to reward. The strength of the re-
ward power of [person] O / [person] P increases with the magnitude of the re-
wards which P perceives that O can mediate for him. Reward power depends
on O’s ability to administer positive valences and to remove or decrease negative
valences. The strength of reward power also depends upon the probability that
O can mediate the reward, as perceived by P. 
The most important reward for terrorist fighters is probably the promise of getting
into heaven after a courageous and heroic death on the battlefield, which is strongly
connected with the previously-mentioned source of power. Just as the religious as-
pect is important for them, the locality is also essential. In the manifesto of the
Al-Khanssaa Brigade mentioned in this paper, the place of residence is family-
friendly and prosperous. This amalgam seems even more complex and influential
when mentioning the coercive source. The threat of being punished is character-
istic of it.57
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Coercive power is similar to reward power in that it also involves O’s ability to
manipulate the attainment of valences. Coercive power of O / P stems from
the expectation on the part of P that he will be punished by O if he fails to
conform to the influence attempt. 
The number of cases of punishment is rather large and the vast majority of activ-
ities in everyday life are strictly controlled. Thus, these types or sources of power
are also significant. Moreover, the authoritarian organizational structure and huge
accumulation of power in the hands of a small group poses the threat of malprac-
tice and manipulation. These can be introduced when referent and expert power
occurs.58
The referent power of O/ P has its basis in the identification of P with O. By
identification, we mean a feeling of oneness of P with O, or a desire for such
an identity. If O is a person toward whom P is highly attracted, P will have a
desire to become closely associated with O. If O is an attractive group, P will
have a feeling of membership or a desire to join. If P is already closely associated
with O he will want to maintain this relationship (40). P's identification with
O can be established or maintained if P behaves, believes, and perceives as O
does. Accordingly O has the ability to influence P, even though P may be un-
aware of this referent power.
The strong bond and sense of identity creates a feedback loop which strengthens
power. An additional and important source of it is the expert knowledge of some
members of the group. The wiser they are, the more attractive they become to
others. The crucial is that knowledge possessed by one person should be held to a
consistent standard.59 In the case of hierarchically organized groups such as the
one analyzed in this paper, the use of knowledge as power is easy to observe because
of the positions held by the knowledgeable. Again, the founding figures or teachers
of extremist religion (imams) who are terrorists are both authorities and transmit-
ters of knowledge. Imams are leaders, and leadership is mentioned by Fred Lunen-
burg as being connected with power:60
The concepts of power and leadership are closely linked. Leaders use power as
a means of attaining group goals. By learning how power operates in organi-
zations, you will be better able to use that knowledge to become a more effec-
tive leader. In its simplest terms, power is the ability to influence someone else
(Nelson & Quick, 2012).
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Leaders usually have access to information that is important to others. Information
can also be manipulated and prepared or presented in a contextually adjusted form.
This constitutes the last type or source of power: information power. According
to Ken Petress, “Information power comes as a result of possessing knowledge that
others need or want.”61 But instead of redistributing power by using empowerment
strategies or providing source-based and verified information, the governors of
today’s caliphates would rather convey it selectively and cleverly. There are even
structures responsible for this, and due to the great possibilities of the Internet and
networking media, this is even possible through post targeting or data scrutiny. 
The set-up of the organization fits perfectly into the contemporary Middle-
Eastern context and is the scaffolding for the promotion and dissemination of the
particular ideas that drive it. There appears to be a feedback loop where ideas drive
the terrorists as well. Such a conglomerate attracts new members, allows for fluent
cooperation, and, consequently, allows terrorists to realize their goals.    
SUMMARY: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Some remarks need to be made at this point in order to sum up the above sections.
Because simplicity is not stupidity, the simpler the idea, the more influential it
can become. Jihadists reach for the most fundamental ideas, such as that of God.
The great affection for such an idea can provoke people to commit crimes in the
name of the idea. The expansive character of the activity of terrorist states displays
an element of imperialism: they require constant expansion to new territories and
to possess new members for “feeding” the conquered territories and recruits. The
more expansive the state wants to be, the more unified it must become; the leaders
must have great potency or power. For this purpose, exploiting basic ideas seems
to be the most efficient solution. 
Since the 1950s, we’ve learned how to measure the power of an idea, even in a
mathematical way. Having applied it, we can conclude that the most visible and
influential among recent terrorist organizations are the Jihadist extremists groups.
Some of them aspire to form states by proclaiming caliphates, e.g., in Syria, Iraq,
and some African territories. They are visible in social media, and their expansive-
ness forces allied states to run military campaigns against them. From a political
perspective, the caliphates cannot be described as states. They are rather conglom-
erates of smaller groups, such as insurgents, rebels, and terrorists fighting for dif-
ferent reasons under the leadership of an influential organization62 driven by a
particular ideology that is focused on religion. The caliphates use skilled methods
for seizing power, including the extensive use of violence. While aiming at
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civilians,63 they can be called a new kind of terrorist group. Today’s facet of global
terrorism can be characterized by nation-state ambitions and cultural wars. It re-
mains hostile to the Western world and violates international law in a variety of
brutal forms, with a global reach via social media and information technology.
The terrorism we see today also has a totalitarian nature. Its statehood is limited
to the rule of a small group with a leader who does not provide verified informa-
tion or freedom to people, but rather threatens and controls them. The most prone
to influence here are children who are indoctrinated and manipulated, even abroad
in Western countries. 
The ideas accompanying these groups include God, law, state, education, to-
talitarianism, terror(ism) through violence, protest, and usually patriarchy (based
on the position of women in the society). In general, they are understood in a pe-
culiar way, without fitting into global standards, definitions, and regulations. All
of this makes today’s terrorism a specific type of terrorism. Maybe such a form is
nothing new in the history of terrorism in general, but it is definitely different to
pre-9/11 terrorism. It also demands further research and analysis using the latest
technologies, which are still in development. Even this form of terrorism’s lack of
dialogue and foreign affairs, in addition to its human rights violations, has not
turned the world’s attention to its obvious need for expansion and power. This
mechanism was explained through reference to the theory of French and Raven,
among other things. 
Both ideas and history are prone to be violent. The social and economic con-
sequences of extremist understanding and the implementation of them may induce
the worldwide escalation of violence, economic destabilization, and the rise of the
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number of armed conflicts. As an answer to the last question stated in the intro-
duction, we might conclude that the strategies adopted by terrorist leaders nowa-
days created this specific form of terrorism. Now, power and ideas are manifested
loudly. There is strong sense of identity and a tendency to antagonize the West
with Islam and alternative interpretations of common ideas. The well-known dif-
ferentiation between the Orient and Occident in the globalized world has now
become a cultural struggle, too. This situation is even stranger when cultures in-
termingle and clash: today’s jihadi terrorist barely reads the Quran by himself,
shoots a Russian rifle, and wears American jeans.64 The distinction is not as clear
it used to be centuries ago, and this fact places attention on well-tempered educa-
tion, free from indoctrination and destructive ideology. Maybe the Occident, the
land of occidens (sunset), can provide these things on a decent level globally, as it
attempted to during the Enlightenment and in modern times, instead of focusing
on military solutions. The combination of state aspirations known by the Euro-
peans since the nineteenth century is now combined with modern warfare, reli-
gion, and global terrorism. This inspires fear in Western citizens, but among
scientists, it suggests the necessity of reconsidering the meanings of concepts;
among politicians, it brings about the need to create new methods of communi-
cation. Information technology, a great tool for disseminating ideas on both sides,
brought everyone to the global level at the same time. This situation reveals not
only the importance of ideas and their special constellations in case of terrorism,
but also power that comes with having the proper tools to disseminate and prop-
agate these ideas. 
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